Recording break-glass access to Linux servers
Break-glass access is the emergency way into a server, kept for when SSO, MFA or your access gateway is down. On Linux it's usually a root SSH key or a console login, and a gateway can't record a session that never passes through it. shellz records on the server, so an emergency login ends up in the same searchable history as an ordinary one. Afterwards you can replay what was done and check that nobody altered the recording.
Choose shellz if
- Your emergency route is a root key kept in a safe, a cloud serial console, or direct SSH that skips the gateway.
- An auditor asks what happened during the last emergency login, and right now the only answer is shell history.
- Whoever breaks the glass has root, and the record of their session has to hold up anyway.
- You want emergency sessions searchable next to everyday ones, by user, server and time.
Add a PAM vault or access gateway if
- The emergency credential must live in a vault, be checked out with approval and be rotated after each use.
- Someone must be able to end an emergency session or block commands while it's running.
- Your break-glass path is a cloud admin role or a Kubernetes cluster, which a Linux terminal recorder can't see.
- Your emergency-access evidence has to live on your own hardware. shellz runs only in its own cloud.
At a glance
| Capability | shellz (on the server) | Access gateway |
|---|---|---|
| Root SSH key used directly on the server | Yes | No: Teleport and Boundary record only sessions they carry |
| Physical or serial console login | Yes, unless your org policy turns console recording off | No: the console never touches the gateway |
| SSH tunnelled through AWS Session Manager | Yes | No: AWS docs say these sessions aren't logged |
| Gateway or SSO provider is down | Yes, recording doesn't depend on them | No: the gateway is the recorder |
| Holds and rotates the emergency credential | No | Yes, in PAM products with a vault |
| Ends a live session | No | Yes, in some products and plans |
Break glass is the way in when the normal way fails
The name comes from the fire alarm behind a glass panel: you only use it in an emergency, and everyone knows when you have. In access control, it's a pre-arranged route into a system for when the usual login path is broken.
Microsoft's guidance lists the typical triggers: the identity provider is down, MFA devices or the MFA service are unreachable, or the last admin has left. On a Linux fleet the emergency route is usually one of three things. It might be a root SSH key kept offline, the cloud provider's serial console, or a direct SSH login that bypasses the gateway.
A gateway can't record a session it never carried
Access gateways record at the point where they relay traffic. Teleport records at its SSH service or its proxy, and its OpenSSH setup has each server trust only certificates its proxy issues. HashiCorp Boundary records on the worker that handles a session. AWS states that SSH tunnelled through Session Manager isn't logged.
A break-glass login goes around all of that by design, because it exists for when the gateway or SSO can't be used. So the session where someone has the most power, during the worst hour of the year, is the one with no recording.
shellz records the emergency login on the server itself
shellz replaces the login shell on every account. Whoever logs in, by key, by password or at a console, starts inside the recorder. Physical and serial console logins are recorded as their own session type. Your org policy can switch console recording off, so check that it's on for servers where the console is your fallback.
Switching to root with su - stays inside the recording. shellz terminates any login it finds running without the recorder and raises an alert. Passwords typed at hidden prompts, such as the one su asks for, aren't captured.
Choose the offline behaviour before you need it
Outages often cut network links too. When a server can't reach shellz, it buffers recordings and uploads them once the connection returns.
A recording policy you set in the dashboard decides whether new logins are allowed while the server is offline. Refusing them keeps every session accounted for. It can also lock you out of a server whose console is your only way back. Settle this per server group in advance, not during the incident.
If a host falls silent, shellz alerts you in about a minute. During a network outage, expect those alerts and read them as part of the incident timeline.
Review every emergency session afterwards
Microsoft recommends alerting on every use of an emergency account and holding a review afterwards. The review decides whether the use was a drill, a real emergency or misuse, then examines what the person actually did. NIST SP 800-53 control AC-6(9) asks for privileged functions to be logged for the same reason.
A recording turns that review from interviews into evidence. The walkthrough below is hypothetical.
- At 02:10 the SSO provider fails. The on-call engineer takes the root key from the safe and logs in to
db-01directly. - Next morning, the reviewer filters sessions by
db-01, userrootand the outage window. One session comes back. - They replay it at high speed and read the transcript. It shows a restarted replication process and one edited config file.
- The session's integrity badge reads verified, so no part is missing or modified. They export the transcript as text and attach it to the incident ticket.
The person holding root can't quietly erase the record
Break-glass users have full control of the machine, so the recording has to survive them. If root changes shellz's configuration, the change is reverted within seconds and reported. A local attempt to uninstall shellz is refused and reported, because removal needs approval in the dashboard.
Recordings leave the server encrypted, in signed pieces chained to each other. After upload they're immutable, and a hole or edit in the chain flags the session as gapped or tampered. A root user can always mess with programs on their own server, and shellz makes that visible.
Keep a vault for the key, and use shellz for the record
shellz doesn't store or rotate the emergency key, approve its use, block commands or end a session. Those jobs belong to a password vault or PAM product. The PAM vs session recording guide explains when a small team needs one. For gateway-specific gaps, see shellz vs Teleport, Boundary alternatives and shellz vs AWS Session Manager.
Covering 10 active devices or fewer costs nothing. Larger fleets go on Commercial at $10 monthly for each shellz user and $1 monthly per GB kept (plans).
Questions
What is break-glass access?
A pre-arranged emergency route into a system, used only when the normal login path is broken, for example when SSO or MFA is down. On Linux servers it's typically a root SSH key, a console login or direct SSH that skips the gateway.
Does Teleport or Boundary record break-glass SSH sessions?
Only if the session goes through them. Both record where they relay traffic, so a direct login with an emergency key or a console login isn't recorded by the gateway. A recorder on the server captures those sessions.
Does shellz record logins on the serial console?
Yes. Physical and serial console logins are recorded as console sessions, unless your org policy has switched console recording off.
What happens if the server can't reach shellz during the outage?
Recordings are buffered on the server and uploaded when the connection returns. Your recording policy decides whether new logins are allowed in the meantime.
Can the admin who used break glass delete the recording?
Not without it showing. Uploads are immutable. Config changes get rolled back with an alert, and uninstalling requires dashboard approval.
Related comparisons
- Teleport vs shellz for SSH session recording/compare/teleport
- HashiCorp Boundary alternatives after the Community Edition archive/alternatives/hashicorp-boundary
- AWS Session Manager session recording vs shellz/compare/aws-session-manager
- Trace a command on a production Linux server to the person who ran it/use-cases/incident-investigation
Sources
Competitor details come from public documentation and pricing pages, last checked on November 4, 2026. Products change; if something here is out of date, tell us at hello@shellz.dev and we will correct it.
- Microsoft Learn: Manage emergency access admin accounts (updated June 2026)
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC-6(9): Log use of privileged functions
- Teleport docs: Session recording architecture
- Teleport docs: Using Teleport with OpenSSH in agentless mode
- Boundary docs: Session recording
- AWS docs: Enabling and disabling Session Manager logging